I guess someone hasn't updated the download Storage Exec uses to update itself. You can download it the old school way in your browser from here: http://uk.crucial.com/gbr/en/support-storage-executive
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Method wrote: Hello everyone ! Is a Crucial SSD's encryption compatible with macOS Sierra's Filevault? Do they run simultaneously if yes ? Do I need to enable or disable the SSD's native hardware encryption ? How can I do that anyway please ? I am refering to a Crucial MX300 SSD I just ordered for my Macbook Pro 13" late 2011 model running Mac OS Sierra all up to date and at the moment using Filevault on my native Toshiba hardrive. Thanks for your help ! Hardware encryption is compatible with any form of software encryption, which Filevault is. Hardware encryption, like in Crucial's SSDs, is active at all times and cannot be deactivated or disabled. The only thing you can enable and disable on a self-encrypting drive is the security subsystem you use for key management and device locking/unlocking. So you can run both simultaneously without any problems.
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BClousing wrote: I recently bought an MX300 to replace my existing SSD boot drive. I used Acronis TrueImage to clone the old disk onto the new one (which didn't work very well, but after a lot of hassle, I managed to make it work). The old disk did not have encryption, but I wanted to setup disk encryption on the new SSD. The problem is that I can't see how to do that. In the past, I've used TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt won't let me setup disk encryption unless it there's an empty partition at the very beginning of the SSD where it can put the boot loader. I don't see how to do that using Acronis TrueImage. I've seen people talking about BitLocker on this forum, but I'm using Windows 10 Home, and it doesn't include BitLocker. So, how do I get encryption up and running? Encryption is automatic and needs no setting up. Though without the ability to secure the drive while it's off/hibernating, the hardware encryption is basically useless. If you want to set up a proper MBR shadowing, a small PBA, enable locking, etc. you can download sedutil for free and it takes about 10-15 minutes to set up. Quite a few people use it.
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Rabinovitch wrote: I got it. But it seems that it's more secure to use 'sedutil' by Drive Trust Alliance, right? Opal is far superior to ATA, and both are superior to eDrive (Microsoft's shady practices never cease to amaze); however, most people are simply looking for the ability to lock their SED and not utilize all of the other Opal functions available (multiple users, create and configure multiple LBA ranges, assign access control to various LBA ranges for Users, muti-factor PBA, etc.) For that, the ATA security I detailed above - with proper Trust commands being utilized - is easier to set up and will do the job without having to do anything else via command-line. Likewise, ATA security is farily unforgiving, particularly if you forget the ATA passphrase. Opal, on the other hand, always has a way to revert the drive back to factory specs by doing a PSID revert. Not to mention, Opal allows passphrases that allow for increased length and any character you wish to use. Sedutil is the only free option one has to be able to lock Opal 1 and 2 drives on desktops and laptops that do not have ATA enhanced security BIOS features. I would always recommend using Opal SSC as opposed to ATA if you have the 10-15 minutes to set it up. I would never recommend eDrive.
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Some may find it difficult, and annoying, to set Opal security on their Crucial SSD after a regular Windows 10 fresh installation. If you use sedutil, or plan to, it's best to set that up BEFORE installing Windows, as Windows will take ownership of the SSD during its default installation procedure. Once Windows 10 is installed, you will sometimes find yourself with error messages when trying to initialize Opal security, quite commonly the error message of NOT_AUTHORIZED and thus, a TakeOwnership failure which prevents SED-specific software the ability to initialize and setup the drive with the end-user's specifications. These errors are more prevalent when attempting to set up Opal security on a Windows device using a Linux partition or a small Linux distro as opposed to a SED software's Windows executable. Even so, I have had software like Wave Security (junk software, anyways) fail Opal security setup within Windows regardless. This is because, as mentioned above, Windows will take ownership of the drive by default by provisioning Opal's C_PIN_SID and C_PIN_MSID template columns using a RNG (random-number generated) PIN. This is similar to how Windows 8 and 10 now take ownership of a device's TPM by creating, and then immediately discarding, a TPM password automatically without allowing the end-user to set his/her own. However, unlike SEDs, the TPM ownership can be changed to allow end-user password creation easily via Group Policy or a simple numerical registry change. In my opinion, Microsoft does not need to take ownership of anything relating to security on a user's device and the fact that Microsoft is starting to take ownership of hardware automatically, and without any setup input by the end-user, in my opinion, negates complete security of a device. Even though Microsoft will tout that it's "more secure" for the software to do it, I'm of the belief it's none of Microsoft's business nor duty to set up hardware security and should always be under control of the end user. Moreover, I understand they do this by default because they want everyone who has a self-encrypting drive to use the eDrive feature which relies on BitLocker to manage. That said, I'm not particularly privy to eDrive nor am I to Microsoft thinking it's their job to take ownership of any piece of hardware I own. Conversely, I also understand some like eDrive because it's free and basically sets itself up without issue, so long as your motherboard meets all of the requirements including UEFI v2.31+ and Secure Boot. Though I personally use WinMagic Enterprise to deploy SED provisioning and PBAs to connected devices, sedutil is a great open-source utility for pure Opal security control. With sedutil, it's best to set your boot device up prior to installing Windows 10 (or 8), when the SSD is factory fresh, or after doing a PSID revert. This in itself will prevent Windows from being able to provision the device itself. One can do a PSID revert, secure erase and sedutil setup from a single bootable USB stick with Parted Magic on it by simply copying the Linux sedutil executable and PBA to the USB stick's root directory. Once you do that, you can boot into Parted Magic, use sedutil to do a PSID revert, use Parted Magic to do a secure erase of the drive, and then setup the fresh drive with sedutil and install the PBA using Parted Magic's terminal, and all from a single bootable USB stick. One can also use a custom unattend.xml or autounattend.xml to prevent provisioning during Windows installation: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<component name="Microsoft-Windows-Setup" processorArchitecture="amd64" publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" language="neutral" versionScope="nonSxS" xmlns:wcm="http://schemas.microsoft.com/WMIConfig/2002/State" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
</component> </settings> </unattend> At the WindowsPE settings pass, you can set disable <EncryptedDiskProvisioning>, which by default, is set to false. This will prevent Windows from automatically provisioning your Crucial SSD (or any SED), which will give you the ability to decide how you want to set your SED up after Windows is installed. Also note how the EFI partition is first as opposed to the Windows Recovery partition. This aids in slightly quicker chain-loading of the OS by a PBA since it's able to locate the EFI boot manager in the first partition Though it's not required to have the EFI partition first, and Windows' default setup puts the Recovery partition first, the proper way to set up a UEFI/GPT hard drive is by setting the EFI partition first. The reason it's not done this way during default installations is because Windows uses the MBR-style partition setup automatically during installation, then adds the EFI System and MSR partitions once the GPT partitioning format is recognized. Similarly, this is why Windows installation does not create the MSR partition at the proper size of 128 megabytes. This in no way affects the Windows Recovery partition from working properly, as the REagentC.exe will auto-detect the partition location of Windows Recovery and set its location for Windows. Now comes the <TCGSecurityActivationDisabled> setting. This setting either enables (default) or disables, using Group Policy, the provisionioning of current unprovisioned eDrives. Though this pass is not mandatory for a single SED installation for a boot drive, since setting <DisableEncryptedDiskProvisioning> to true already prevents the provisioning of the boot drive, it will prevent BitLocker from attempting to make any changes, via Windows' eDrive feature, on additional SEDs set up after a Windows installation, which is beneficial if you change your boot device by doing a backup and restore, dual-boot or simply add a 2nd SED as a non-boot drive. Moreover, this setting in itself will also prevent Windows from provisioning a boot device, like <DisableEncryptedDiskProvisioning> does, if set to the WindowsPE settings pass for setup. If this pass is used to prevent TCG Security Activation, it can easily be enabled using gpedit.msc and going to Local Computer Policy > Computer Configuration > System > Enhanced Storage Access. I personally set both <TCGSecurityActivationDisabled> and <DisableEncryptedDiskProvisioning> to true in my autounattend.xml to prevent any provisioning of any sort by Windows. So what's the difference between an unattend.xml and autounattend.xml? Well an unattend.xml is fairly basic because it's meant as a generic setup script for all client machines being deployed an install.wim using a Windows Deployment Server over PXE at boot, or it can be entirely custom - like an autounattend.xml - used after a SysPrep on a specific device. An Autounattend.xml is used for custom Windows installations generally designed for a single specific PC/laptop. Upon the start of a Windows OS setup, Windows setup first searches for an autounattend.xml which needs to be put in the root directory of the installation media. If found, Windows installs itself entirely based on the autounattend.xml's settings. If it's not found, Windows installs with all of it's default settings. If anyone wants an autounattend.xml that disables all encryption provisioning - and much of Windows' behind-the-scenes data gathering - I can upload a fairly universal one for both UEFI and MBR that you can edit to your liking.
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jimdandy wrote: I am sorry but this software is bonkers. I am literally only trying to clone the image backup, the system, and JUST the windows OS from my 1TB HDD to 275GB SSD and it's telling me I need another 632some odd GB of space on the target drive?? Even when I do successfully find enough "space" to clone, the program doesn't even launch. Is there anyone who can just tell me how to get a working version of windows OS on my new SSD so I can boot it and install games on it? As posted above, I highly recommend Macrium Reflect. Even their free edition far surpasses the dependability, backup and restoration abilities of Acronis' paid version. Acronis has a prettier GUI and that's it. Acronis' tech support is awful and their software installs a plethora of junk processes and lacks full end-user modification ability (i.e. able to run custom PowerShell and/or Batch files for the backup/cloning processes). I use Macrium Home Edition on my business Lenovo ThinkPad and Dell Latitude laptops, and their Server Edition on my Windows Server 2016 Datacenter Dell enterprise server and have never had any issues doing anything including deploying to completely new hardware (HDD SAS to SSD SAS, motherboard swaps, or just HDD to SSD). You can also download their other free utility called "viBoot" which will enable you to mount their backups as a VHD(x), allow you to navigate the backup, make changes if you so desire, and then automatically run a differential backup or incremental backup right from the modified VHD (incremental backups are only available in the paid version, along with AES encryption and multiple other security features). Acronis is good for simple backup and restore, but when it comes to changing hardware it can be quite, well, pi*sy; particuarly when it comes to self-encrypting drives. Macrium Reflect Free should do what you need without so much as a hickup and do it properly. Just my .02.
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